Income inequality in the OECD is at its highest level, and Chile is the most unequal country among them with a Gini coefficient of disposable household income that reached 0.465 in 2013, compared to the 0.318 OECD average for 2014. In unequal economies, the influence of special interest groups in setting the governments´ agenda and the allocation of resources is critical. Openness in lobbying practices has the potential to democratize the access to public authorities, thus fostering a reduction in inequality. Through an analysis of the main impacts of the implementation of the Lobby Act in Chile, we will assess how the Lobbying regulation in this country has the potential to have a significant impact in the way that interest groups participate in the decision-making process with the government, congress and other public institutions. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the goals of the initial legal framework and the early results since its enactment in 2014. Building upon concrete results, we provide an understanding of the capabilities of the new framework to level the field, stimulate competition and accountability, and reduce the unequal access to authorities. In the end, the Lobby Law in Chile has the potential to lessen the capture from certain private actors in setting the agenda, the regulation process, and the public resource allocation.
Lobby Regulation in Chile: a Pathway toward Reducing Inequality
